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decentralization in a large panel data set, we show that FD is significantly and 
negatively related to budget deficits.  Moreover, among the many possible factors that 
may reinforce this relationship, country size is the most relevant one.  The paper also 
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I.  Introduction 
Decentralisation, defined as the "devolution of power and authority to local  
administrations", has economic, fiscal, political and administrative aspects (see, 
Litvack, 1999).  Fiscal decentralization, the subject matter of this paper, can be 
defined as the devolution of policy responsibilities from central government towards 
local governments with regards to spending and revenue collection decisions. 
   Within the context of federal systems, fiscal decentralization is often referred  
to as "economic federalism".  Inman and Rubinfield (1997) argue that "economic 
federalism prefers the most decentralised structure of the government capable of 
internalizing all economic externalities, subject to the constitutional constraint that all 
central government policies be decided by an elected or appointed central planner".   
The authors also argue that the most complete description of fiscal federalism is due 
to Oates (1972): "The central government is assigned responsibility for those public 
activities distinguished by significant externalities involving spatially dispersed 
populations, while local governments have responsibility for those public activities for 
which such spillovers are limited or absent". 
Decentralisation has been viewed to be an appealing feature of economic 
reform programs based on the following arguments: i) decentralization of spending 
increases economic efficiency since local governments have better information about 
local preferences, and hence it permits non-uniform provisions that better match with 
the preferences of citizens
1 (see, for example, Samuelson [1954], Oates, [1972] and 
[2001]).  ii) Decentralisation is expected to boost accountability and transparency in 
                                                 
1 The public goods considered to be more efficient if provided in a decentralised manner are 
not pure public goods with wide spill-over effects, but local public goods.   5
service delivery (de Mello, 2000a).  iii) In addition, if local accountability exists, tax-
payers may also better cooperate with local governments (Wasylenko [2001]).
2   
Tanzi (2000) suggests, however, that effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation in  
improving allocative efficiency depends on factors such as the size of country, the 
extent of privatization in the economy
3; ability of local governments to raise revenue; 
transparency and; local administrative and institutional capacity.  Empirical evidence 
in support of these arguments can be found in Panizza (1999), who shows that the 
larger the country the greater the information advantage of local government, and Von 
Braun and Grote (2000), who empirically demonstrate that fiscal decentralization 
helps to eliminate poverty only in the presence of political decentralization that makes 
local governments accountable.   
While decentralising budgetary spending, granted the above modifications, may 
be efficiency-enhancing, decentralising revenue-collection may not be so, however.   
Among the major possible reasons for this are that local governments either have 
limited tax-bases available to them or they fail to fully exploit the existing ones 
(possibly due to due to tax exportation) and; local debt issuance and management 
capacity is limited.  For these reasons, vertical and horizontal revenue sharing is 
generally necessary (see De Mello [2000a], De Mello and Barenstein [2001]).
4  De 
Mello and Barenstein (2001), for example, show that, unlike expenditure 
decentralisation, the lower is revenue decentralisation, the better is governance. 
                                                 
2 Panizza (1999) provides an overview of the theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization.  
He groups the existing literature as the studies on: i) optimal division of powers 
(decentralization theorem); ii) the role of organization costs and; iii) competition among 
jurisdictions. 
3 privatization can be considered as substitute for local government in the provision of local 
public goods and services 
4 In a study of US federalism, Inman and Rubinfield (1991) argue that the provision of local 
public good, rather than pure public good, requires 100% local taxation for it to be efficient.   6
Limited revenue autonomy of local governments implies, however, that their 
expenditure autonomy is also possibly limited and thus local governments may turn 
out to be mere spending units of the central governments.  This, in turn, limits the 
ability of local governments to perform counter macroeconomic cycles at local levels 
(De Mello, 2000b).   
  There are also various arguments against expenditure decentralization.  First, 
local governments may suffer from lack of economies of scale in the provision of 
public goods; particularly, information and coordination costs may be higher for local 
governments than for the central government.  Secondly, if local vested interests are 
powerful, in the absence of local accountability, decentralization increases corruption 
and social fragmentation (see, for example, Blanchard and Shleifer [2000] and 
Bradhan and Mookherjee [1998]).  Thirdly, decentralization may increase the 
competition and political tensions among local governments.  Fourthly, lack of 
institutional and administrative capacity of local governments may prevent the 
benefits of decentralization from being realized.  Fifthly, coordination problems 
across different tiers of government may hinder fiscal reforms and implementation of 
macroeconomic adjustment.   
   To summarize, the literature suggest evidence both favor and disfavor fiscal 
decentralization.  While the empirical literature on issues related to fiscal 
decentralization has markedly grown in the recent years, however, evidence on the 
macroeconomic effects fiscal decentralization has been rahter scant.  A couple of 
recent exceptions are Jin and Zou (2002), who demonstrate that while expenditure 
decentralization increases the size of aggregate governments, revenue decentralization 
has a reverse impact, and King and Ma (2001), who find a negative at the relationship 
between revenue decentralization and inflation.    7
This paper investigates the nature of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and budget deficits.  We hypothesize that if fiscal decentralization 
increases public sector efficiency, lower budget deficits would result -- provided that 
appropriate structural, administrative and institutional characteristics are in place.  
Using a large set of panel data on both expenditure and revenue types of fiscal 
decentralisation, we empirically test whether decentralizing fiscal activities is 
conducive to lower budget deficits after controlling for the various factors that both 
theoretical and empirical literature suggests to affect this relationship, such as 
governance, size of the country and the extent of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.   
The findings of the paper largely lend support for the hypothesis that 
expenditure decentralisation has significant relation with deficits.  In addition, the 
evidence indicates that the larger the size of the country the more pronounced is this 
relationship.  The evidence also suggests that good governance reinforces these 
relationships, especially in larger countries.  Furthermore, the findings indicate that, 
the larger the country, the effect of revenue decentralization in reducing deficits is 
only realized in case of good governance, local accountability and high levels of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we 
summarize the empirical literature on fiscal decentralization.  Section 3 presents the 
data and methodology of the paper.  Section 4 summarizes the findings of the 
regression analysis and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Review of Empirical Studies on Fiscal Decentralisation 
A number of cross-sectional studies have investigated the association of fiscal 
with various social indicators.  De Mello (2000a) shows that higher social capital,   8
defined as confidence in government, civic cooperation and associational activity, is 
positively related with fiscal decentralization.
5  De Mello (2001) also finds evidence 
that good governance is positively related with subnational spending levels and the 
higher the nontax revenues (i.e. grants and transfers from higher levels of 
government) the stronger this relationship.  In addition, Fisman and Gatti (2002) find 
a strong negative relationship between expenditure decentralisation and corruption, 
while Treisman (2000) observes no significant relationship between the two variables, 
due possibly to different measures of corruption and inclusion of more control 
variables.
6  
In a study of the determinants of fiscal decentralization, Panizza (1999) finds 
evidence that country size, income per capita, the level of democracy, and, though 
weakly, ethnic fractionalization
7 all have positive impact on the level of fiscal 
decentralization.  De Mello (2000a) also argues that ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
affects fiscal decentralization.  
Reviewing the empirical literature that yield conflicting evidence on the 
relationship between government size and fiscal decentralization, Jin and Zou (2002)  
provide panel evidence that while expenditure decentralization increases the size of 
aggregate governments, revenue decentralization has a reverse impact.  In addition, 
King and Ma (2001) claims that revenue decentralization has a negative impact on 
average inflation in only developed countries. 
                                                 
5 Excluding the case where fiscal decentralization is measured by vertical imbalances, which 
are defined as the ratio of inter-governmental transfers to total tax revenue of subnational 
governments (De Mello, 2000a).  
6 Treisman finds evidence of a strong positive relationship between decentralization and 
corruption using "structural" aspect of decentralization, which refers to mainly political 
decentralization accounted for by a dummy that takes the value of 1 if federal system and 0 
otherwise.  
7 which is used as a measure of heterogeneous preferences   9
Several other studies also investigate the individual country experiences with 
fiscal decentralisation.  According to Eaton (2001), for example, political parties in 
Argentina and Philippines have used the reform aspect of decentralization as a tool of 
manipulating the party control over revenues and expenditures.  The author also 
points at the dangers of decentralization due to a compromise between the complexity 
in the intergovernmental relations, on the one hand, and transparency and 
accountability, on the other.  Barrett, (2000) argues that, in Japan, mere transfer of 
authority to local governments, without local autonomy, has promoted a yet more 
powerful central government.  Inspecting the cases of Russia, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan, Norris et al. (2000) also point out that greater autonomy and 
accountability assigned to local governments and transparency with regards to 
spending and revenue collection arrangements are all necessary for obtaining the 
benefits of decentralization.  Feltenstein and Iwata (2002) argue that fiscal 
decentralization has had adverse effects on inflation in China.   
In contrast to the above studies that point out the adverse effects of fiscal 
decentralization, Hope (2000) suggests that decentralisation in Botswana has 
promoted greater local autonomy and accountability.  Various studies
8 also argue that 
decentralization has also contributed to economic growth in China via better 
monitoring and management of local enterprises, better utilization of local revenue 
sources and greater efficiency in resource allocation.  Neyapti (2002) shows that, in 
Turkey, the more decentralized the expenditures the lower are volatility of private 
investment, central expenditures and transfers
9, and the higher are both the level and 
the growth rate of income per capita across provinces.  Also the higher is revenue 
decentralization, the greater is agricultural value added and income, and the lower is 
                                                 
8Dethier (based on Yilmaz, 2000), Lin and Liu (2000) and Feltenstein and Iwata (2002).    10
the volatility of transfers. Education and health, however, do not appear to be 
significantly related with fiscal decentralization in Turkey. 
  The review of the literature shows that the evidence on the benefits of 
decentralization is rather mixed.  Moreover, the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
budget performance remains to be an important issue yet to be investigated.  This 
paper contributes to the literature in this respect. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
  In this section, we first discuss the variables used in our empirical analysis 
(Section 3.1), then provide a brief descriptive report of the basic trends in 
decentralization across both developed and less-developed countries and over time 
(Section 3.2) and finally define the methodology employed for the regression analysis 
(Section 3.3). 
3.1  Variables used in the estimation: 
We construct three measures of expenditure decentralization: 1. the share of 
total spending by the state and provincial governments in total spending of the state, 
provincial and central governments combined (EXPs&p/TOT); 2. the share of current 
spending by the state and provincial governments in the total current spending of the 
state, provincial and central governments combined (EXPs&p/CURR) and; 3. the 
share of total spending by the local governments in the total current spending by both 
the central and local governments combined (EXPloc/CURR)
10.  We use state and 
provincial governments, on the one hand, and local governments, on the other, as two 
alternatives for sub-governments since the categorization of the sub-governmental 
                                                                                                                                            
9 controlling for the level and volatility of GDP, emergency state and priority regions.   11
level of activities is not uniform across countries.
11  We also generate the revenue 
counterparts of all these three variables, which we call REVs&p/TOT, 
REVs&p/CURR and REVloc/CURR, respectively.   
Considering that social security spending is fairly larger in developed 
countries than in less developed countries, our analysis excludes this component from 
the central government spending definition to avoid a bias in our results.
12  In 
addition, we exclude defense spending from the central government spending.  As 
Panizza (1999) points out, these exclusions lead us to focus on the "decentralizable" 
part of fiscal spending, which is appropriate for the current analysis.
13  
Appendix 1 provides the data used in this study along with their sources.  Data 
used in this study covers up to 30 years of observation for 23 countries for s&p/TOT, 
19 to countries for s&p/CURR and 48 countries for loc/CURR measures of both 
expenditure and revenue decentralization.  The panel is unbalanced and the actual 
number of available observations ranges between 189 to 484, depending on the 
measure of FD used. 
 
3.2   An Overview of the Trends in Decentralization: 
 
For all types of decentralization measures, we observe that developed 
countries have by far higher decentralization than less developed countries, as a group  
(see Figure 1).   Interestingly, Figure 1 also shows that since 1970s there has been no 
                                                                                                                                            
10 "Local " definition of government spending is only available for current expenditures and 
not for total expenditures.  
11 An alternative measure that could be obtained adding up the two (s&p and loc).  However, 
this is an artificially created variable since in many countries subgovernmental level activity 
is reported under either one and not both, and also this aggregation yields a smaller data size 
than the smallest of the other definitions of FD (i.e. the current spending or revenues at state 
and provincial level).   
12 For instance, social security spending in Sweden and Luxembourg has been more than 20% 
of GDP, and more than 15% of GDP in Finland and Netherlands during the 1990s.   12
notable trend towards a greater degree of decentralization either in developed (DCs) 
or in less developed countries (LDCs). While both spending and revenues in the 
LDCs have remained more centralized than in the DCs as of the end of the 1990s, 
there has been little change with regards especially to revenue decentralization both in 
developed and less developed countries since 1970s.  Since decade averages refer to 
different cross section coverages, however, one should observe these observations 
with some caution.  
In addition, Appendix 2 shows that, from 1970s to the end of 1990s, Canada, 
Switzerland, Australia and United States, in that order, rank among the most 
decentralized (with respect to fiscal expenditures) countries, followed by Argentina 
India, Pakistan and Brazil from the less developed group of countries.  It is also 
possible to observe a few noticeable country-specific trends.
14  Among the developed 
countries, Austria, Switzerland, USA have had less decentralized spending since the 
1970s with respect to the first measure of expenditure decentralization, whereas Spain 
and Germany have had more decentralized spending (according to the second and 
third definitions) during the last decade.  Among the less developed countries, 
Argentina has also gone through a notable expenditure decentralization since the 
1970s, while Bolivia, Malaysia and Peru have had the reverse tendency.   
 
3.3.  Methodology: 
Using the data described above, we initially estimate the following models: 
Yit = b0 i + b1 (EXPkj /EXPj)it +b2 (REVkj /REVj)it … (1) 
Yit = a0i + a1 (EXPkj /EXPj)it +a2 (REVkj /REVj)it + 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Indeed, once the social security and defence component of government spending is taken 
out,  indicators of expenditure decentralization appear much higher in developed countries 
than in less developed countries.   13
                         a3 [DCi*(EXPkj /EXPj)it] +a4 [DCi*( REVkj /REVj)it] ……..      (1') 
where Y stands for overall budget deficits in percentage of GDP.  Subscript it stands 
for country i at time t; k stands for state and provincial or the local definitions of the 
government; and j stands for total (current and capital) or current only.
15  We use both 
expenditure and revenue decentralization variables as the right hand side variables to 
find out which one performs better.  In Model (1'), where DC stands for a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 for developed countries and zero otherwise, we investigate the 
possible differences in the responsiveness of macroeconomic variables to FD between 
developed countries and less developed countries.  In Section 4, we first report the 
findings of this basic model, followed by various modifications based on the 
introduction of various control variables. 
To identify whether the models have to be specified by random or fixed 
effects, both of which are more efficient than the OLS estimation with a common 
constant term for panels with a large cross-country component, we employ the 
Haussman specification test (Chi-square)
16.  The test of the hypothesis that fixed 
effects specification is inconsistent indicates that fixed effects procedure is 
appropriate for the estimation of deficits in the third sample in case of both models.  
Since it is more efficient to use fixed effects in the largest sample (using the third 
                                                                                                                                            
14 This observation is based on time series of individual countries. 
15 Using the measure obtained by summing up the local and state and provincial definitions of 
of spending (or revenues) for the estimation of models (1) and (1’) leads to very similar 
results (not reported) to those reported below.  
16 The null hypothesis of the Haussman (1979) test is that, assuming that both OLS and GLS 
are consistent, OLS is inefficient, the alternative being OLS is consistent but GLS is not.  In 
other words, the Haussman statistic tests for the correlation between the individual effects and 
explanatory variables.  Rejection of the null hypothesis thus leads to the adoption of fixed 
effects model against the random effects model (see Hsiao [1986], Greene [1993] or Baltagi 
[1995]).   14
definition of FD), we use the fixed effects method in all the estimations reported 
below to keep a standard estimation method.
17 
Table 1:   Haussman test (c
2) results for Fixed versus Random effects  
(Columns 1 to 3 indicate models based on the three decentralization measures) :  
____________________________________ 
Dependent Variable: 
                    Deficit/GDP                                       
Models:     1          2               3   
(1)    0.88       3.58         14.01
*** 
    (0.64)      (0.17)      (0.00)   
 
(1')    15.84
***      5.07        27.98
***  
     (0.00)      (0.28)      (0.00)   
_____________________________________ 
Note:   Numbers in parentheses are the p-values. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
 
4. Regression Analysis 
 
In this section, we test the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization, measured by 
both expenditure and revenue decentralization, has significant relationship with 
budget deficits.  Hence, our main hypothesis is that b1 and b2 terms in Model (1) are 
significantly different from zero.  In addition, by looking at the coefficients of the 
interaction terms with the DC dummy in Model (1'), we investigate whether fiscal 
decentralization has different impacts in developed and less developed countries.  
Section 4.1 as well as Table 2.a report the results of the estimation of Models (1) and 
(1').    
In Section 4.2, we introduce several modifications to Model (1).  Section 4.2.1 
modifies Model (1) by introducing size of the government and rate of growth of GDP, 
as a proxy for business cycles, as additional control variables.  In Section 4.2.2, we 
further investigate whether various governance indicators, political instability, the size 
                                                 
17 We nevertheless also estimated the random effects model as an alternative method for case 
of the first two definitions of FD. The regression results (not reported, but available from the   15
of the country and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (as a measure of diversity in 
preferences) matter for the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the 
macroeconomic variables of interest.  In Section 4.4, we use weighted least squares 
estimation technique as an alternative method to analyze the influence of these 
various institutional and structural variables on the effectiveness of FD.  In all 
estimations below, coefficients of the fixed effects are not reported to save place.  
 
4.1.  Estimation of Models (1) and (1¢):  
The hypothesis we test is that if fiscal decentralization improves efficiency in 
fiscal administration, its impact on deficits should be negative.  We find that all three 
measures of expenditure decentralization (ED), reported in the first three columns in 
Table 2.a, support this claim at statistically significant levels.  As for revenue 
decentralisation (RD), however, only the 3
rd definition is significantly negative.
18  
Including the interaction terms of FD with developed country dummy, DC, we 
obtain the following results, reported in columns 4 to 6 in Table 2.a.  While the fit of 
the regressions that use interactions with DC only slightly improve as compared to 
Model 1 (columns 1 to 3), we observe that both the size and the significance of ED 
measures improve substantially for the set of less developed countries.  However, in 
Model (l¢) we again observe that only the third definition of RD, which coincides with 
a much larger sample size than others, shows statistically significant and negative 
                                                                                                                                            
author upon request) remain virtually the same as the ones reported in Section 4 below.  
18 The results are likely to be affected by multicollinearity between expenditure and revenue 
decentralization measures (see Appendix 3). When expenditure and revenue decentralization 
measures are used alone on the right hand side along with the fixed effects, we observe that 
RD as well are always negatively significant, though not as highly as ED measures.  In 
addition, only the first definition of RD is significant.   16
relationship with deficits.  Estimation of Models (1) and (1’) using the first two 
definitions of FD reveals virtually the same results.
19   
Decomposition of these effects into developed and less developed countries 
reveals that, evidence on the significance of both expenditure and revenue 
decentralisation measures is rather weak for developed countries: only the 3
rd 
definition of RD is significant, but that with a positive sign.
20  The coefficients of the 
rest of the terms are insignificant for the subsample of developed countries.  
Hence, the evidence is quite robust for the negative significant relationship 
between deficits and especially expenditure decentralization in less developed 
countries.  While the evidence with regards to the negative relationship between 
revenue decentralization and deficits is weaker, the evidence regarding the 
relationship between both types (expenditure and revenue) of FD and deficits is much 
weaker for the developed countries sample.  In all the foregoing estimations, the 
hypothesis that fixed effects are jointly zero is rejected at 1 percent level. 
 
4.2.  Extensions: 
  In this section, we first introduce additional control variables: the ratio of 
government spending in GDP, as a measure of the size of the government, (G) and the 
rate of growth in real GDP (GDPgr), as a proxy for business cycles.  Section 4.2.1. 
reports the results of the estimation of Model (1) with the addition of these control 
variables.  Section 4.2.2. reports the results of the regressions where, in addition, we 
introduce various institutional and structural variables, as further control variables, in 
interaction with FD. 
                                                 
19 Those results are available upon request. 
20 The coefficients for developed countries can be read as the sum of the coefficients b1 and b3 
in columns 4 to 6 in Table 2.a.   17
4.2.1. Controlling for the size of the government and Business Cycles  
Reestimating Model (1) by controlling for the size of the government (G), we 
confirms the robustness of expenditure decentralization (ED), while the size variable 
itself also appears positive and significant for all definitions of ED.  We next repeat 
the estimation after controlling for both G and GDPgr.  Using this model, whose 
results are reported in Table 2.b, we observe that while earlier results regarding the 
coefficients of FD remain, G is also highly significant and positive in all regressions 
while GDPgr is significantly negative only in case of the first definition of FD.   
4.2.2. Controlling for Additional Institutional and Structural Variables: 
In this section, we estimate deficits with one of the FD terms at a time, in addition 
to its interaction with the variables that the literature suggests to be related with 
decentralization: namely, governance indicators, country size (measured both as 
population and area), ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and dummy for the presence of 
local elections.
21  As measures of governance, we use the indices of: control of 
corruption, rule of law, political instability, governmental efficiency, voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality (Kaufman et al, 2002).
22  The total number of 
related variables and thus the interaction terms (used in separate regressions) are 10.  
In addition, as in Section 4.21, we control for the size of the government (G) and 
business cycles (GDPgr).   
Hence we estimate the following models: 
       Yit = fi + g1 (EXPkj /EXPj)it + g2s (Xs)it (EXPkj /EXPj)it  + g3G + g4 GDPgr .…(2) 
and:  
                                                 
21 Area and ethnolingusitic fractionalization figures have been compiled by William Easterly.  
Local elections dummy is also based on the Easterly data set and evaluated to be 1 for 
wherever there are either municipality or state elections, and zero otherwise.   18
        Yit = f'i + g'1 (REVkj /REVj)it + g'2s (Xs)it (REVkj /REVj)it + g'3G + g'4GDPgr  ...(2') 
where Xs (s =1, 2…10) stands for any of the 10 control variables that we hypothesize 
to be relevant for the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization.  Having normalized
23 all 
the Xs variables between 0 and 1, we use them in interaction with either expenditure 
or revenue decentralization measures at a time (Models 2 and 2', respectively).
24  To 
reduce the possible biases that could arise from multicollinearity, in each model, we 
use only one FD measure by itself and in interaction with one of the 10 variables at a 
time.
25   
Using the normalized variables in interaction with the fiscal decentralization 
measures amounts to assigning higher weights to fiscal decentralization under the 
cases of what we may group as better governance indicators (i.e. lower political 
instability; higher values of government efficiency, voice and accountability, 
regulation quality, control of corruption, rule of law and the presence of local 
elections, which proxies accountability of local administrations) and in cases of larger 
country size (measured by population and geographical area) as well as greater ethno-
linguistic fractionalization.  In these estimations, we refrain from also using the 
interactions with the DC dummy since they are also highly correlated at least with the 
interaction variables that involve governance indicators. 
The main hypothesis tested with the estimation of models (2) and (2') is therefore 
that if Xs contributes to the effectiveness of FD, the interactive terms would be 
                                                                                                                                            
22 The estimates for each of all the six governance variables are based on an analysis of wide-
ranging data sources -- comprised of both polls and surveys conducted in individual countries 
(see, Kauffman 2002). 
23 The values of all these variables, except for the dummy for local elections, are converted 
into a range between 0 to 1 where greater values indicate better governance, lower political 
instability, but larger size of the country and greater degree of ehtnolinguistic 
fractionalization. 
24 since using both types of interactions together would lead to a lot of multicollenearity as Xs  
(EXPij /EXPj) and Xs (REVij /REVj) are highly correlated with each other for a given ij.   19
significantly negative.  Since we have 10 such interaction terms and 6 measures of 
fiscal decentralization (3 measures each for expenditure and revenue 
decentralization), this amounts to 60 regressions.  For tractability, we therefore only 
report the signs of the interactive terms -- whenever significant -- in Table 3.
26  
Below, we discuss these results in detail.     
4.2.2.1.  Estimation using Interactive Terms for Expenditure Decentralization: 
Estimation of Model (2) generally yields negative coefficients for expenditure 
decentralization (ED), where significant (not reported).
27  In addition, the size of 
government is always positive and significant, while GDP growth is negatively 
significant, except in the 3
rd sample (not reported).   
Looking at the interactive terms, whose signs are reported in Table 3 where 
significant, we observe that (the first two measures of) ED’s negative effect on 
deficits increases in cases of large country size, measured both by population and area 
as kilometer-square.  This evidence supports the proposition of Tanzi (2000) and 
complements the findings of Panizza (1999) in that, besides impacting on the extent 
of FD, the size of a country renders FD more effective.   
In addition, however, we observe a positive and significant relationship between 
expenditure decentralization and deficits in cases of better governance and greater 
degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  The finding that ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization may reduce the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization is plausible.  
In fact, this is a complementary evidence to the literature, which suggests that 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, representing diversity of preferences, has a positive 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Using a single factor (principle component) instead to represent all the measures of 
governance does not add much to the findings. 
26 Regressions are available from the author upon request. 
27 Expenditure decentralization itself is significant in cases of the inclusion of its interactions 
with political stability (first two definitions), government efficiency, rule of law,   20
impact on FD
28, in that they together may lead to higher deficits due to budgetary 
pressures stemming from diverse preferences.  
The lack of evidence on the efficiency enhancing effect of good governance on 
FD (negative coefficient of the interactive terms), however, is not expected.  
Considering that none of the interaction terms that involve governance indicators (i.e., 
control of corruption, government efficiency, regulation quality, rule of law and voice 
and accountability and political instability) yields any negative coefficient renders an 
explanation involving a measurement problem inadequate.  We therefore resort to the 
only obvious explanation that there is no impact of good governance on the 
relationship between FD and deficits; that is, panel evidence indicates that FD reduces 
deficits regardless of the quality of governance across countries.  Truncating the 
sample into developed and less developed samples also does not yield any major 
improvement over this finding.  Hence, we anticipate that, the high correlation 
between FD and the various governance indicators (more than 60 % for all measures 
of FD) may be the reason why the interaction variables between the two do not 
convey any further useful information. 
 Finally, the positively significant coefficient of the interaction between the third 
definition of ED and the local election dummy may reflect that local administrators 
who are locally elected may tend to spend more the more decentralized the spending 
in order to fulfill the demands of their constituencies and thus fiscal prudence may 
decline.   
4.2.2.2.   Estimation using Interactive Terms for Revenue Decentralization: 
                                                                                                                                            
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (first two definitions), local elections and area (first two 
definitions). 
28 see, for example, Panizza (1999) and De Mello (2000a).   21
Using interactions with revenue decentralization (RD), Model (2') also yields 
significant positive coefficients for all the interaction terms that involve governance 
variables, though only in the third sample (see Table 3).  An exception is the 
insignificant coefficient of the interaction of FD with political instability in the 3
rd 
sample.  In addition, we observe that the interaction of RD with the local election 
dummy is negatively significant only in the first sample.  We also observe that 
interactions of RD with the country size are not always negative and significant; it has 
a negatively significant coefficient only when used in interaction with population in 
the first two samples.   
Finally, we note that revenue decentralization itself is negative wherever it is 
significant (not reported).
29  The coefficients of G and GDPgr are also significant, 
positively and negatively, respectively, with the same exceptions reported for the case 
of the estimation of Model 2 (not reported).   
 
4.3. Estimation with the Weighted Least Squares Method (WLS): 
Estimation of Models (2) and (2') reported above indicates that the size of a 
country, measured either by population or by area, appears to reinforce the 
effectiveness of, especially, expenditure decentralization in reducing deficits.  
Interaction terms that involve governance indicators, however, yield unintuitive 
results.  In order to further explore the interaction of FD with governance variables 
and to increase the efficiency of the estimation to some extent, we estimate a version 
of Model (2) and of Model (2'), where we now use population as the weight in a 
                                                 
29 More specifically, RD itself is significant when both population and area are used as 
interaction variables in the first two samples and when government efficiency, rule of law and 
local elections are used as the interaction variables in the third sample.   22
weighted least squares (WLS) estimation
30 (Models 3' and 3'', respectively).  To avoid 
multicollinearity, we again use only one of the remaining 9 interactive terms
31 at a 
time to estimate the following alternative models:  
wiYit = b'0 i + b'1 wi(EXPkj /EXPj)it +b'2 wi(REVkj /REVj)it + b'3G + b'4 GDPgr ........ (3)  
wiYit = di + q1 wi(EXPkj /EXPj)it + q2 [(Xs)it* wi(EXPkj /EXPj)it] + q3G +q4 GDPgr ..(3') 
wiYit = d'i + q'1 wi(REVkj /REVj) it + q'2 [(Xs)it* wi(EXPkj /EXPj)it]  
+ q'3G + q'4 GDPgr.….......… (3'') 
where wit stand for the normalized population figures
32, which we may as well denote 
simply as wi, since population varies only slightly within a country, as opposed to 
across countries. 
  To compare the WLS results with the OLS results of Model (1) as modified in 
Section 4.2.2.1 (reported in Table 2.b), we first estimate Model (3). The estimation 
results reported in Table 4 can be summarized as follows.  Estimation of Model (3) 
yields notably more significant coefficients for expenditure decentralization than 
those reported in Table 2.b.  In addition, the goodness of fit
33 in each case improves 
notably.
34  We also observe that while the size effect (G) is positively significant 
across all measurements of FD as before, GDPgr is now only barely significant in the 
third sample.  In this model, however, the coefficient for revenue decentralization 
                                                 
30 see Appendix 4 for an explanation of WLS. 
31 The six governance indicators, namely government efficiency, rule of law, regulation 
quality, voice and accountability, control of corruption and political instability are especially 
highly correlated. 
32 Drawing on the results reported in Table 3, one may think of using the dummy for local 
elections as an alternative weighting factor.  We also tried this but the results are much less 
significant. 
33 Since the R-bar squares of the weighted regression is a meaningless concept, rather than 
comparing that between the weighted and unweighted regressions, we compare the squared 
correlation between the fitted and actual values of the dependent variables.  I owe thanks to 
Christopher Baum for raising this point. 
34  Using one of the governance indicators or local elections as an alternative weight (wi), on 
the other hand, does not yield such improved results.   23
loses its significance in the third sample, while it becomes significant and negative in 
the first sample.   
These results indicate that, while decentralizing expenditures is more effective in 
reducing deficits in case of highly populated countries, decentralizing revenues is not.  
This implies that collection of revenues dominated by local governments in largely 
populated countries is possibly less efficient due to various factors that the literature 
points out, such as administrative and capacity constraints.   
To account for the rest of the variables (Xs), we also estimate Models (3') and (3''), 
which lead to the following observations, reported in Table 5.  All interactions with 
the governance variables, except for voice and accountability index in the first 
sample, and with ethnolinguistic fractionalization are negatively significant across all 
measures of ED.  In addition, interactions with area are significant in the first two 
samples.  Expenditure decentralization term itself remains negative and significant 
across all samples in regressions involving interactions with ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, area and local elections and with government efficiency in the first 
sample only.  These observations lead to the important finding that good governance 
reinforces the effect of expenditure decentralization in reducing deficits.  The 
coefficients of government size remain robustly significant across the regressions, 
while GDPgr is insignificant in the 1
st and the 2
nd samples.  
Estimation of Model (3''), on the other hand, leads to negatively significant 
coefficients for all interactive terms across the three definitions of RD.  RD terms 
themselves, however, lose their significance.  We also observe that he robustness of 
both GDPgr and G turn insignificant in the first two samples.  We thus conclude that, 
the larger the country, good governance significantly contributes to the impact of 
revenue decentralization on deficits.      24
In conclusion, our empirical analysis (based on the estimation of equations 1 thru 
3''), indicates that expenditure decentralization, regardless of structural or institutional 
factors, is robustly significant for deficits, while revenue decentralization is not.  In 
addition, the evidence indicates that the size of the country reinforces this effect.  The 
evidence further indicates, however, that --the larger the country size-- both good 
governance and high ethnolinguistic fractionalization contributes to the effectiveness 
of expenditure decentralization in reducing deficits.  Moreover, the efficiency of 
revenue decentralization in reducing deficits recovers only after controlling for both 
the country size or the quality of governance.    
 
5. Conclusions 
There is a remarkable volume of recent research focusing on the relationship 
between socio-economic variables and fiscal decentralization.  In this paper, we 
investigate the benefits of fiscal decentralization from the perspective of its possible 
association with a key macroeconomic indicator: budget deficits.  We test the 
hypothesis that the greater fiscal decentralization the lower are budget deficits.  
The evidence in this paper suggests a significant relationship between fiscal  
decentralization and deficits.  However, the findings of this paper call for a caution 
about an immediate policy recommendation towards higher fiscal decentralization; 
along the lines of the literature, the evidence in this paper indicates that country 
characteristics and institutional features are closely related with the effectiveness of 
fiscal decentralisation in terms of leading to lower deficits.  More specifically, our 
empirical analysis reveals that the size of the country influences the effectiveness of 
expenditure decentralization more robustly than any other factor that the literature 
proposes to enhance the benefits of fiscal decentralization.     25
The evidence further indicates, that, the larger the country, both good governance, 
and high ethnolinguistic fractionalization contribute to the effectiveness of 
expenditure decentralization in reducing deficits.  Thus, it is possible to argue that, 
having controlled for the country size, the relationship between FD and deficits is 
largely influenced by the quality of governance.  Finally, we observe that revenue 
decentralization becomes effective in reducing deficits only in case of larger country 
size, higher quality of governance and the presence of local elections.  26
APPENDIX 1:  Variable Definitions/Abbreviations and Sources: 
 
 
DC                      : Dummy for industrialized countries (21) 
 
Deficits      :Overall (consolidated) budget deficits / GDP   
(IMF-IFS, line 80) 
 
ED:  Expenditure decentalization  
 
EXPs&p/TOT   : Total spending by State and Provincial Governments/ Total 
Government Spending (Central + State and Provincial)   
    (IMF-GFS: [82, JZG]/[82+82,JZG])   
 
EXPs&p/CURR  : Current spending by State and Provincial Governments/ 
Current Government Spending (Central + State and Provincial)  
  (IMF-GFS: [82R, JZG]/[82R+82R,JZG]) 
   
EXPloc/CURR   : Current spending by Local Governments/ Current 
Government Spending (Central + Local) 
  (IMF-GFS: [82R, LZG]/[82R+82R,LZG])   
 
G    : Consolidated government spending/GDP  (IMF-IFS) 
 
GDPgr    : Rate of growth in real GDP. (IMF-IFS) 
 
RD    : Revenue decentralization 
 
REVs&p/TOT   : Total Revenue by State and Provincial Governments/ Total 
Government Revenue (Central + State and Provincial) 
  (IMF-GFS: [81Y, JZG]/[81Y+81Y,JZG])     
   
REVs&p/CURR  : Current Revenue by State and Provincial Governments/ 
Current Government Revenue (Central + State and Provincial)  
(IMF-GFS: [81YD, JZG]/[81YD+81YD,JZG])   
 
REVloc/CURR  : Current Revenue by Local Governments/ Current Government 
Revenue (Central + Local)  
  (IMF-GFS: [81YD, LZG]/[81YD+81YD,LZG])       27
APPENDIX 2:  Rankings of Countries with respect to Expenditure Decentralization. 
 
Sorted by: EXPs&p/TOT EXPs&p/CURR EXPloc/CURR
Netherlands Antilles 0,65 Canada 0,63 Denmark 0,59
Canada 0,65 Switzerland 0,60 Netherlands Antilles 0,58
Switzerland 0,60 Argentina 0,52 Sweden 0,55
Argentina 0,54 Australia 0,50 Finland 0,53
Turkey 0,51 United States 0,46 Guatemala 0,52
Australia 0,50 India 0,42 Switzerland 0,49
United States 0,47 Pakistan 0,41 Mongolia 0,48
India 0,45 Korea, Rep. 0,35 Norway 0,45
Pakistan 0,38 Brazil 0,33 United States 0,42
Brazil 0,36 Germany 0,32 Canada 0,38
Germany 0,34 Colombia 0,29 Netherlands 0,35
Korea, Rep. 0,27 Austria 0,26 United Kingdom 0,35
France 0,26 Mexico 0,22 Italy 0,31
Peru 0,26 Spain 0,21 Ireland 0,29
Austria 0,26 Bolivya 0,21 Austria 0,26
Colombia 0,25 South Africa 0,18 Germany 0,25
Bolivya 0,25 Indonesia 0,16 Spain 0,24
Mexico 0,23 Malaysia 0,13 Luxembourg 0,24
Spain 0,22 Peru 0,12 Zimbabwe 0,23
Malaysia 0,20 Portugal 0,02 Uruguay 0,22
South Africa 0,19 Portugal 0,02 France 0,22
Indonesia 0,12 Belgium 0,00 Iceland 0,21
Portugal 0,02 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,00 Israel 0,16
Belgium 0,00 Bolivya 0,16
Burkina Faso 0,00 Average 0,28 Australia 0,16
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,00 Belgium 0,15
Netherlands 0,00 Indonesia 0,14
Sri Lanka 0,00 Brazil 0,14
Thailand 0,00 Chile 0,14
Tunisia 0,00 Colombia 0,12
Venezuela, RB 0,00 South Africa 0,09
Thailand 0,09



















Average 0,20  28
APPENDIX 3:  Correlations among the major variables used in the analysis. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EXPs&p/TOT               (1) 1,00 0,99 0,64 0,89 0,89 0,56 0,71 0,60
EXPs&p/CURR           (2) 0,99 1,00 0,67 0,88 0,87 0,58 0,73 0,60
EXPloc/CURR             (3) 0,64 0,67 1,00 0,57 0,57 0,93 0,72 0,59
REVs&p/TOT               (4) 0,89 0,88 0,57 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,54 0,45
REVs&p/CURR           (5) 0,89 0,87 0,57 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,53 0,44
REVloc/CURR             (6) 0,56 0,58 0,93 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,64 0,59
Control of corruption   (7) 0,71 0,73 0,72 0,54 0,53 0,64 1,00 0,78
Regulation quality        (8) 0,60 0,60 0,59 0,45 0,44 0,59 0,78 1,00
Voice and account.     (9) 0,68 0,68 0,63 0,47 0,46 0,59 0,94 0,83
Government effic.      (10) 0,62 0,65 0,72 0,46 0,44 0,66 0,97 0,80
Rule of law                  (11) 0,65 0,68 0,74 0,48 0,47 0,70 0,97 0,79
Political Stability        (12) 0,60 0,61 0,66 0,46 0,45 0,57 0,92 0,67
Population                  (13) 0,11 0,11 0,24 0,21 0,23 0,11 -0,06 -0,02
Area                            (14) 0,62 0,61 0,23 0,72 0,73 0,08 0,31 0,15
Ethnoling. Frac.          (15) 0,09 0,07 0,21 0,18 0,17 0,31 0,06 -0,08
Local Elections          (16) 0,54 0,52 0,34 0,43 0,43 0,31 0,38 0,67
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
EXPs&p/TOT               (1) 0,68 0,62 0,65 0,60 0,11 0,62 0,09 0,54
EXPs&p/CURR           (2) 0,68 0,65 0,68 0,61 0,11 0,61 0,07 0,52
EXPloc/CURR             (3) 0,63 0,72 0,74 0,66 0,24 0,23 0,21 0,34
REVs&p/TOT               (4) 0,47 0,46 0,48 0,46 0,21 0,72 0,18 0,43
REVs&p/CURR           (5) 0,46 0,44 0,47 0,45 0,23 0,73 0,17 0,43
REVloc/CURR             (6) 0,59 0,66 0,70 0,57 0,11 0,08 0,31 0,31
Control of corruption   (7) 0,94 0,97 0,97 0,92 -0,06 0,31 0,06 0,38
Regulation quality        (8) 0,83 0,80 0,79 0,67 -0,02 0,15 -0,08 0,67
Voice and account.     (9) 1,00 0,89 0,93 0,90 -0,08 0,27 -0,02 0,43
Government effic.      (10) 0,89 1,00 0,96 0,90 -0,03 0,19 0,10 0,35
Rule of law                  (11) 0,93 0,96 1,00 0,92 -0,05 0,25 0,07 0,32
Political Stability        (12) 0,90 0,90 0,92 1,00 0,06 0,30 -0,02 0,25
Population                  (13) -0,08 -0,03 -0,05 0,06 1,00 0,54 -0,11 0,12
Area                            (14) 0,27 0,19 0,25 0,30 0,54 1,00 0,13 0,22
Ethnoling. Frac.          (15) -0,02 0,10 0,07 -0,02 -0,11 0,13 1,00 -0,29
Local Elections          (16) 0,43 0,35 0,32 0,25 0,12 0,22 -0,29 1,00  29
APPENDIX 4: Weigted Least Squares (WLS)     








ºß ￿￿ , which is consistent regardless of the weights used as long 
as weights are uncorrelated with the error terms.    30
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Figure 1:  Trends in Expenditure and Revenue Decentralization in Developed and      
                Less Developed Countries since 1970s.  
 



























70s 80s 90sTable 2.a:  Dependent Variable: Deficit/GDP 
     
Explanatory variables:      1  2  3     4  5  6 
      s&p/TOT  s&p/CURR  loc/CURR    s&p/TOT  s&p/CURR  loc/CURR 
                   
Expenditure Decentralization    -9.94***  -18.54***  -36.25**    -27.13***  -22.55***  -59.60** 
      (-2.91)  (-5.35)  (-2.27)    (-5.42)  (-5.83)  (-2.27) 
Revenue Decentralization    6,24  4,76  -61.99**    12,01  5,91  -144.24*** 
      (0.94)  (0.74)  (-2.36)    (1.56)  (0.85)  (-3.89) 
DC*Expenditure Decentralization          28.23***  18.21**  48,84 
              (4.21)  (2.16)  (1.50) 
DC* Revenue Decentralization          -1.62  -6.10  211.33*** 
              (-0.11)  (-0.35)  (4.03) 
                            
R-bar squared      0,27  0,40  0,23    0,33  0,41  0,28 
# of observations      269  189  478    269  189  478 
F-test for ED in DC's (1)            0,06  0,34  0,31 
F-test for RD in DC's (2)                0,75  0,002  3.28* 
Notes:  Figures in parantheses are the t-ratios             
             (1)  Test of the hypothesis that the coefficient of expenditure decentralization in developed countries is zero.      
             (2)  Test of the hypothesis that the coefficient of revenue decentralization in developed countries is zero.      
***   reject null at 1 per cent significance level.              
**     reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.           
*       reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.           
 Table 2.b:  Controlling for size effect and business cycles   
              
       Dependent Variable: Deficit/GDP 
      1  2  3 
Explanatory variables:       s&p/TOT  s&p/CURR  loc/CURR 
           
Expenditure Decentralization  -0.14***  -0.16***  0.57*** 
      (-4.71)  (-4.98)  (3.75) 
Revenue Decentralization  0,04  -0.03  -0.77*** 
      (0.74)  (-0.42)  (-3.43) 
G      0.25***  0.23***  1.17*** 
      (7.55)  (5.36)  (13.28) 
GDPgr      -0.001***  -0.001  0.0004 
      (-3.37)  (-1.55)  (0.42) 
                
R-bar squared    0,46  0,50  0,47 
# of observations     266  187  470 
Note:  figures in parantheses are the t-ratios     
***   reject null at 1 per cent significance level.      
**     reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.   
*       reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent. 
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Table 3 :  Signs of Individual interactive terms (Models 2 and 2'): 
                   
     1  2  3 
      s&p/TOT  s&p/CURR  loc/CURR 
Explanatory variables:           
Interactions of Expenditure Decentralization with:     
Political Stability           
Government efficiency    +  +  + 
Voice and accountability    +  +  + 
Regulation quality      +  +  + 
Control of corruption    +  +  + 
Rule of law      +  +  + 
Population      _  _   
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  +  +   
Area      _  _   
Local Elections          + 
           
Interactions of Revenue Decentralization with:     
Political Stability           
Government efficiency        + 
Voice and accountability        + 
Regulation quality          + 
Control of corruption        + 
Rule of law          + 
Population      _  _   
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization       
Area           
Local Elections      _    + 
             
Note:  Only the significant coefficient signs are reported     37
 
Table 4: Weighted Least Squares (weights: normalized population figures),    
             controlling for size effect and business cycles.     
                       Dependent Variable: Deficit/GDP    
Explanatory variables:      1  2  3    
      s&p/TOT  s&p/CURR  loc/CURR   
             
Expenditure Decentralization    -0.35***  -0,32***  -0,33***   
      (-11.28)  (-8.60)  (-7.87)   
Revenue Decentralization    -0.004***  -0.002  -0,0002   
      (-3.02)  (-1.32)  (-0.16)   
G      0.28***  0.15***  0.22***   
      (10.37)  (4.51)  (7.99)   
GDPgr      -0.0002  0,0004  -0.001*   
      (-0.46)  (0.69)  (-1.96)   
                   
Corr(Y-fitted,Y)^2  (2)    0,32  0,3  0,72   
# of observations       266  187  470    
Notes:  (1)  Figures in parantheses are the t-ratios;        
              (2)  R-bar-squared for weighted least squares are meaningless.  The corresponding  
                figures for the unweigted regressions are: 0.11; 0.12 and 0,3, respectively.      
***   reject null at 1 per cent significance level.        
**     reject null at 5 per cent significance level but not 1 per cent.     
*       reject null at 10 per cent significance level but not 5 per cent and 1 per cent.   
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Table 5 :    Signs of Individual interactive terms (Models 3 and 3')       
(WLS with weights: normalized population figures)       
       Dependent Variable: Deficit/GDP     
       1  2  3     
Explanatory variables:       s&p/TOT  s&p/CURR  loc/CURR     
               
Interactions of Expenditure Decentralization with:         
Political Stability      _  _  _     
Government efficiency    _  _  _     
Voice and accountability      _  _     
Regulation quality      _  _  _     
Control of corruption    _  _  _     
Rule of law      _  _  _     
Population                   
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  _  _  _     
Area      _  _       
Local Elections        `       
               
Interactions of Revenue Decentralization with:         
Political Stability      _  _  _     
Government efficiency    _  _  _     
Voice and accountability    _  _  _     
Regulation quality      _  _  _     
Control of corruption    _  _  _     
Rule of law      _  _  _     
Population                  
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  _  _  _     
Area      _  _  _     
Local Elections      _  _  _     
                 
Note:  Only the significant coefficient signs are reported       
(*)  In these regressions decentaralization is not itself significant.       
(**) Revenue decentralization itself is mostly positively significant for the first 2 columns of D regressions    
        and the 1st column of Deficits,and mostly negatively significant for the 3rd column of Deficits.   
 